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It pays to be a tax haven. Ireland has become rich that way. Why do not all countries follow the Irish example, 
cut their capital taxes and get wealthy? One reason is structural. As the economic standard model of tax competi-
tion explains, small countries gain from competitive tax cuts while large countries suffer. Yet not all small (large) 
countries have low (high) capital taxes. Why? The reason, we argue, is political. While the economic standard 
model implicitly assumes competing governments to be democratic, more than a third of countries world-wide 
are non-democratic. We explain theoretically why autocracies are less likely to adjust to competitive constraints 
and test our argument empirically against data on the corporate tax policy of 99 countries from 1999 to 2011. 
Our findings shed light on how domestic institutions and global markets interact in economic policy making.
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Dictators Don’t Compete: 
Autocracy, Democracy, and 
Tax Competition 
1. Why are not all countries tax havens?
Tax havens are rich. On average, the GDP per capita 
of tax havens (i.e. countries, that make a sustained 
effort to attract mobile foreign capital by low or zero 
tax rates) is twice as high as that of non-tax havens 
(Dharmapala and Hines 2009, 1061). Why do not 
all countries cut their capital taxes and get wealthy?
Economic theory provides a partial answer. The eco-
nomic baseline model of tax competition suggests 
that the incentives to compete vary with country size 
(Keen and Konrad 2012; Wilson 1999). Small states 
can gain from tax competition: Poaching foreign 
tax base is potentially welfare-enhancing for them. 
Large states, by contrast, lose in welfare terms. They 
are better off farming domestic tax resources. Ac-
cording to this logic, we should expect small coun-
tries to engage in aggressive tax competition but not 
large ones. Indeed, tax havens are generally small. 
The largest country on most tax haven lists is Swit-
zerland with a population size of 7.5 million (Dhar-
mapala and Hines 2009, 1067). Yet, most countries 
are small. The global median country size is just 6 
million, i.e. slightly smaller than Switzerland and 
considerably smaller than the global average size 
of 32 million (WorldBank 2013, data based on the 
year 2010). But not all small countries adopt low 
tax strategies. And not all large countries keep 
their capital taxes up even though economic theo-
ry predicts low international competitive pressure. 
Why? Why do not all countries adjust their capital 
taxation to international competitive constraints?
The answer, we argue, is politics. Governments’ in-
centives to adjust to tax competition are conditioned 
by domestic institutions. Democratic governments 
are institutionally constrained to be sensitive to the 
welfare implications of their tax policies. Hence, 
they tend to cut taxes if their country is small enough 
to potentially profit from tax competition and tend to 
keep rates up (or cut them by less) if their country 
is large.  Autocratic governments, by contrast, have 
fewer incentives to adjust to their competitive en-
vironment because their governments are less con-
cerned about the general welfare of their populations 
and less able to lure in foreign capital by low taxes. 
Our analysis, using panel data on the corporate tax 
rates of 99 countries over the period 1999-2011, 
contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it 
introduces regime differences into the economic 
literature on tax competition. As we explain theo-
retically and show empirically, democracies and au-
tocracies react differently to tax competition. While 
democracies compete along the lines suggested by 
economic theory, autocracies do not. Democracies 
are susceptible to competitive pressure while au-
tocracies are largely immune to it. Contrary to what 
is sometimes suggested in the economic literature 
(Edwards and Keen 1996), tax competition has little 
disciplining effect on corrupt and predatory regimes. 
Second, our analysis adds nuance to the institutional-
ist literature in comparative political economy. It sup-
ports the basic claim that domestic institutions me-
diate between international constraints and national 
policy responses, but shows that same institutions 
do not always produce same effects. Institutional ef-
fects vary in countries’ structural position in the in-
ternational economy, and more particularly in coun-
try size: While democratic institutions translate the 
competitive constraints of global markets into strong 
downward pressure on capital taxes in small coun-
tries they insulate tax rates from competitive down-
ward pressure in large countries. Ignoring the inter-
action effect between structural conditions (country 
size) and domestic institutions (regime type) leads 
to the systematic underestimation of both factors.
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larger share of mobile capital towards B; lower taxes 
in A depress B’s revenues by poaching capital from 
B. This interdependency triggers a ‘race to the bot-
tom’ in taxation as each country tries to attract capital 
from the other. In equilibrium, capital tax rates are 
lower in both countries than they would otherwise be. 
The normative implications of the baseline model 
are controversial (see Edwards and Keen 1996, for 
a summary). Some argue that the competitive race 
to the bottom undermines efficiency by constrain-
ing the ability of benevolent governments to supply 
optimal levels of tax-financed public goods (Wilson 
1999; Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986).  Others insist 
that tax competition enhances efficiency by limiting 
the ability of predatory governments to over-tax do-
mestic society (Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Wein-
gast 1995). The causal logic of the baseline model 
is uncontroversial though. There is general con-
sensus that governments of all stripes are forced to 
compete under conditions of economic integration. 
The baseline model has been extended in various 
ways. Perhaps the most important extension concerns 
the influence of country size (Bucovetsky 1991; Kan-
bur and Keen 1993). In a symmetric setting of same-
sized countries, the baseline model predicts that both 
countries face the same incentives to cut taxes and 
suffer equal welfare losses in the non-cooperative 
equilibrium. In an asymmetric setting, however, the 
smaller country faces stronger incentives to cut tax 
rates than the larger country and suffers a smaller 
welfare-loss in the competitive equilibrium. Indeed, 
if the difference in country size is large enough, the 
smaller country is better off under tax competition 
than in its absence. There is a structural “advantage of 
‘smallness’” (Wilson 1999, 288) in tax competition. 
Why is small size a competitive advantage? Intuitive-
ly, in pondering capital tax cuts governments have to 
weigh the costs in terms of lost revenue from domestic 
capital against the benefits associated with capital in-
flows from the other country. In the small country with 
a narrow domestic capital tax base and lots of foreign 
Finally, our analysis challenges key assumptions in 
the political science literature on globalization. Most 
of this literature takes for granted that international 
economic integration constrains the policy autonomy 
of national governments either by increasing eco-
nomic risk and driving up voters’ demand for social 
protection (so-called compensation thesis) and/or by 
triggering a competitive race to the bottom that un-
dermines governments’ ability to supply social pro-
tection (so-called efficiency thesis). We show that 
economic globalization can also have the reverse ef-
fect. It enhances national policy options – but only 
in small democracies. The effect of international 
capital mobility is more ambiguous than the global-
ization literature acknowledges. Ignoring this ambi-
guity leads to underestimating the effects of inter-
national market integration on domestic outcomes. 
The rest of the paper is organized into four sec-
tions. The following section 2 reviews the eco-
nomic baseline model of tax competition. It ex-
plains why country size matters for competitive 
incentives. Section 3 introduces domestic institu-
tions. It explains why democratic governments are 
generally more responsive to competitive incen-
tives than autocratic governments. Section 4 tests 
our argument against evidence on global corporate 
tax competition. Section 5 summarizes our findings 
and discusses theoretical and political implications.
2. The economics of tax competition
While the economic literature on tax competition is 
extensive (see Genschel and Schwarz 2011; Keen 
and Konrad 2012, for recent reviews), most of it 
starts from the same baseline model. In its simplest 
form, this model is about two identical countries 
sharing one internationally mobile tax base, capital 
(Wilson 1999; Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986). The 
tax policies of both countries are interdependent be-
cause one country’s capital tax revenue depends on 
the other country’s capital tax rate: higher taxes in 
country A swell country B’s revenues by pushing a 
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capital to attract, the cost-benefit ratio is more likely to 
be favorable than in the large country with lots of do-
mestic capital to lose and little foreign capital to win. 
Slightly more formally, a tax cut in country A has 
two opposite effects. First, it increases the net (af-
ter-tax) rate of return on capital in A. This attracts 
mobile capital from country B. The capital inflow 
increases A’s capital- labor ratio, and, by implica-
tion, depresses the gross (before-tax) rate of return 
on capital in A (because capital becomes more abun-
dant relative to A’s labor supply). Second, the out-
flow of capital to A decreases the capital-labor ratio 
in B. This pushes up the gross rate of return on capi-
tal (because the scarcity of capital increases relative 
to B’s labor). In a symmetric setting, both effects 
contribute equally to the international equalization 
of the net rate of return: A’s capital-labor ratio ris-
es to the same extent as B’s ratio falls. In an asym-
metric setting, by contrast, the capital-labor ratio of 
the small country reacts more strongly to a change 
in tax rates than the ratio of the large country. Since 
the denominator (labor) is smaller than in the large 
country, a unit change in the numerator (capital) has 
a bigger influence on the ratio. Hence, the smaller it 
is the more country A benefits more from a tax cut 
(in terms of an improved capital-labor ratio) and the 
more it suffers more from a tax rise (in terms of a 
deteriorating capital-labor ratio)(Bucovetsky 1991; 
Keen and Konrad 2012, 6-8; Wilson 1999, 278-279). 
In summary, the large country has less to win from a 
tax cut (and less to fear from a tax hike) because the 
cut triggers strong countervailing reactions in the rest 
of the world (i.e. in the small country). These reac-
tions dampen the incentive effect of the cut (and the 
disincentive effect of the hike). The large country thus 
faces a less elastic capital supply than the small coun-
try and has less incentive to compete in tax cutting, 
all else equal. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, the 
small country undercuts the large country’s tax rate 
and ends up with a disproportionately large share of 
the mobile capital tax base. This does not necessarily 
imply higher capital tax revenues (because the small 
country’s capital tax rate is low and possibly close to 
zero). But it pushes up the capital-labor ratio, fuels 
labor demand and thus leads to higher employment, 
higher wages and, eventually, to higher tax revenues 
from labor and consumption. In this way, not only 
capital profits from tax competition but labor as well 
– in the small country. The bill is paid by labor in 
the large country. It suffers twice from the tax-driven 
outflow of capital to the small country: first in terms 
of less tax financed redistribution from the reduced 
domestic capital stock and, second, in terms of de-
pressed labor demand, employment levels and wages 
due to the fall of the capital-labor ratio.1  
Figure 1: Country size and corproate tax rate of 113 countries, 
2011. Sources: KPMG (2007-2011) and World Bank (2013) 
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As a first empirical cut, figure 1 compares the corpo-
rate tax rates of 112 countries in 2010. The rates are 
significantly related to country size as the baseline 
model predicts: small countries like Cyprus and Ire-
land undercut the rates of large countries such as Ja-
pan, and the United States.2  However, the correla-
tion is far from perfect because some small countries 
such as Fiji and Libya have substantially higher rates 
than much larger countries such as China, and Rus-
sia. Why do not all countries follow the logic of the 
22
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baseline model? The answer we propose in the next 
section is politics: countries’ reactions to tax compe-
tition are conditioned by domestic political institu-
tions. 
3. The politics of tax competition
Clearly, we are not the first to investigate the link be-
tween tax competition and domestic institutions. A 
large literature in comparative political economy has 
analyzed how domestic factors including the num-
ber and ideological range of veto players (Basinger 
and Hallerberg 2004; Ganghof 2006), the structure of 
electoral institutions (Hays 2003, 2009), the partisan 
composition of government (Garrett 1998; Garrett 
and Lange 1991), budget constraints (Ganghof 2000; 
Genschel 2002; Swank and Steinmo 2002), wel-
fare regime (Campbell 2005), variety of capitalism 
(Swank 2013) or equity norms (Plümper, Troeger, and 
Winner 2009) shape national responses, slow down 
the international race-to-the-bottom, and allow for 
more capital taxation under conditions of tax compe-
tition than the baseline model would seem to suggest. 
While this literature has proven extremely versatile 
and informative, it suffers from two important limita-
tions. First, it is narrowly focused on advanced West-
ern democracies (for exceptions see: Cao 2010; Li 
2006). This is problematic because roughly a third 
of the countries of the world is not democratic (Ged-
des, Wright, and Frantz 2012, 26).  As we will show, 
autocratic governments are generally less respon-
sive to international tax competition than democra-
cies. Second, even though the literature usually con-
trols for country size, it ignores its nonlinear causal 
properties. This leads to flawed results because, as 
we will also show, the effect of domestic regime 
type on tax rate setting interacts with country size. 
While democratic institutions bias governments to-
wards high capital taxes in large countries, they push 
governments towards low taxes in small countries. 
In this section we develop a model that improves on 
both limitations. The model builds on the economic 
baseline model but adds institutional variety in terms of 
regime differences between autocracies and democra-
cies. The model shows that democracies are generally 
more responsive to tax competition than autocracies.
The key difference between democracies and au-
tocracies is in who has a say in government selec-
tion and policy making. Democracy is “govern-
ment of the people, by the people, for the people” 
(Lincoln). Autocracy is government of the elite, by 
the elite, for the elite. Democratic regimes are “in-
clusive” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2003). They ensure “open access” to 
the political process (North, Wallis, and Weingast 
2009), “political equality” among citizens (Acemo-
glu and Robinson 2006), electoral accountability of 
the government (Przeworski 1991) and the rule of 
law (Weingast 1997). Nondemocratic institutions, 
in contrast, are exclusive. They restrict access to 
political decision making, institutionalize political 
inequality between incumbent elites and disenfran-
chised masses, and insulate the government from 
political checks and balances and legal constraints. 
Why does the difference between democracy and 
autocracy matter for tax competition? Simplifying 
greatly, the literature suggests two potentially rel-
evant effects. Some authors highlight the incentive 
effect of political regimes on the policy choices of 
government: democratic institutions incentivize gov-
ernments to provide efficient, welfare-enhancing and 
inequality-reducing public goods to the general pub-
lic, while autocratic institutions encourage wasteful 
and inequality-enhancing discrimination and rent-
seeking on behalf of constituent elites (Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Other scholars em-
phasize the constraining effect of political regimes 
on government discretion: democratic institutions 
restrict discretion by subjecting the government to 
electoral accountability, political checks and bal-
ances, and the rule of law; autocratic institutions en-
hance discretion by insulating the government from 
political and legal constraints. As a consequence, 
autocracies have more policy flexibility in the short-
22
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run but democracies can more easily commit to long-
term policy stability and property rights protection 
(Olson 1993; Przeworski 1991; Schultz and Weingast 
2003). As we will argue next, both mechanisms, in-
centives and constraints, help explain why democra-
cies are generally more willing and more able to ad-
just to international tax competition than autocracies. 
3.1 The willingness to compete
Theories emphasizing the incentive effect of domestic 
regimes start from the assumption of office-seeking 
governments: Governments want office; they need 
political support in order to gain and maintain office; 
and they use their policy-making power to pay off 
their supporters (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Bue-
no de Mesquita et al. 2003). The policies they choose 
vary in the preferences and needs of the support 
groups on whom they depend for political survival. 
Democracies depend on mass support because all cit-
izens have a say in government selection and forma-
tion primarily through free and fair elections but also 
through the freedom of expression and the freedom of 
association. The dependence on mass support forces 
democratic governments to target their policies at the 
interests of a broad majority of citizens as represent-
ed, under a range of plausible assumptions, by the 
median voter (Meltzer and Richard 1981). The medi-
an voter is typically poorer than the national average, 
and relies mostly on wage income (Rudra and Hag-
gard 2005, 1018). Her interests are often best served 
by efficient policies that increase mass incomes be-
fore taxes and by broad-based redistributive programs 
that increase mass incomes after taxes and transfers. 
Autocracies depend on minority support because only 
a select few have a say in government formation such 
as, for instance, the members of the royal family, mil-
itary officers, bureaucratic elites, or domestic busi-
ness elites. All other citizens are formally or factually 
excluded from politics because there are no elections 
as in Saudi Arabia, because voting rights are restrict-
ed as in Apartheid South Africa, because elections are 
rigged as in Tajikistan, or because opposition groups 
are repressed as in Qatar. Hence, short of the threat of 
a general revolution, the survival of autocratic gov-
ernments depends on their ability to serve the spe-
cial interests of their constituent elites. The elites are 
typically richer than the majority. They often rely on 
domestic capital income as, for instance, the Russian 
oligarchs, or enjoy privileged access to public rent-
income as managers of state owned-enterprises (Chi-
na), as members of the security forces (Fiji), as public 
bureaucrats (Singapore) or as members of privileged 
ethnic groups or religious sects (Syria). The best way 
to serve the interests of the elites is often by target-
ed discrimination and redistribution in their favor. 
The implications for tax competition are straight for-
ward: democratic governments have an incentive for 
competitive tax cutting if this benefits the majority, i.e. 
the median voter; autocratic governments have an in-
centive to compete if this benefits their elite supporters. 
Consider democracies first. According to the baseline 
model the welfare effects of tax competition vary with 
country size. In small democracies, the median voter 
gains because the disadvantage of competitive con-
straints on fiscal redistribution from domestic capi-
tal is more than compensated by the positive effects 
of tax-induced capital inflows: higher employment, 
higher wages, buoyant tax revenues. This creates an 
incentive for governments to cut capital taxes that of-
ten dominates ideological preferences for high capi-
tal taxation. The Irish Labour Party, for instance, has 
been a staunch supporter of low Irish corporate tax 
rates since the onset of the European Single Market 
in 1993: “Labour in government introduced the 12.5 
percent corporation profits tax rate, and we will insist 
that it remains in place” (Labour 2011, 15). In the 
same vein, Denmark’s social-democratic government 
promotes cutting the Danish corporate tax rate well 
below the level of neighboring countries as part of its 
2013 “Growth Plan DK” (Bomsdorf 2013). Rhetoric 
aside, this is the same strategy, Paraguay’s conserva-
tive President Nicanor Duarte used in 2004 to give his 
country a competitive edge (NOTIMEX 2004) or that 
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Austria’s right-wing coalition, supported by the social 
democratic opposition, used in 2005 to gain an advan-
tage over its large neighbor Germany (Format 2003).
In large democracies, the median voter loses from 
tax competition because the negative effect of less 
redistribution from a shrinking domestic capital tax 
base is compounded by the economic disadvantages 
of capital outflows: depressed labor demand, stagnat-
ing wages, shrinking revenues. These negative effects 
create an incentive for governments to go slow on tax 
competition and restrict capital tax cuts. Tellingly, all 
initiatives to reign in “harmful” tax competition in 
Europe and worldwide have come from large coun-
tries such as Germany, France, the UK and most im-
portantly the United States (Genschel and Schwarz 
2011, 359-363). Also, the left-right divide on cor-
porate tax issues is often more pronounced than in 
small democracies. Think, for instance, of Francois 
Hollande’s bid during the French Presidential elec-
tions 2012 to shift the tax burden from small business 
to large corporations (Hollande 2012, Point 6 of Hol-
lande’s presidential program). Another example is 
the decision of Mexico’s left-leaning government in 
2013 to suspend the mild corporate tax cuts adopted 
by its conservative predecessor and to increase other 
capital taxes to consolidate the budget (Day 2013). 
The reactions of autocratic governments to tax com-
petition depend on the ruling elites’ preference for 
capital inflows. These preferences are not systemati-
cally related to country size. Small autocracies will 
exploit their structural advantage of smallness if this 
serves the interests of their rulers, as arguably in Sin-
gapore where the government relies heavily on for-
eign capital and multinational corporations to gain 
autonomy from domestic society (Khondker 2008; 
Verweij and Pelizzo 2009). But autocracies will ig-
nore the advantage of smallness, if capital inflows are 
politically irrelevant or detrimental for the govern-
ment. Military dictatorships, for instance, are often 
more concerned about short-term increases of the 
defense budget than about long-term growth pros-
pects: the first priority of Fiji’s military regime upon 
usurping power in 2006 was a 39 percent pay rise 
for the armed forces, not tax-induced capital inflows 
(Narsey 2012). Small autocracies may also want to 
keep capital taxes high because they lack mass loy-
alty and therefore depend on easily administered tax 
handles like the corporate tax (Winer and Kenny 
2006, 187) or because high tax rates are a handy in-
strument to reward loyal supporters through selective 
tax exemptions (Dharmapala and Hines 2009, 1063).
Likewise, large autocracies lack systematic incen-
tives to keep their capital taxes up. Russia, Ka-
zakhstan, and China are examples of large autoc-
racies with corporate tax rates substantially below 
what the baseline model would seem to suggest. 
In summary, democratic majorities are more sensi-
tive to the broad welfare implications of tax competi-
tion than the minorities on which autocratic govern-
ments rely for political support. As a consequence, 
democratic governments are generally more willing 
to adjust to tax competition than autocracies. As we 
will argue next, they are also more able to adjust. 
3.2 The ability to compete 
Theories emphasizing the constraining effect of do-
mestic regimes on government discretion start from 
the assumption of risk-averse capital. Capital own-
ers will only invest if they have credible guarantees 
against future expropriation including indirectly 
through tax hikes, corruption or embezzlement. 
While governments have an incentive to prom-
ise investment-friendly policies ex ante, the cred-
ibility of these promises varies in the institutional 
constraints on governments’ ability to renege on 
them ex post. Two types of constraint are particu-
larly important: the rule of law and constitutional 
constraints including electoral accountability and 
political checks and balances (Keohane, Macedo, 
and Moravcsik 2009; North, Wallis, and Weingast 
2009; Olson 1993; Schultz and Weingast 2003). 
The rule of law provides insurance against the arbi-
trary violation of property rights by the government 
or by third parties. It is an integral element of de-
22
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mocracy because respect for the law, an independent 
judiciary, and an effective court system are essen-
tial not only for property rights protection but also 
for safeguarding the constitutive openness and in-
clusiveness of the democratic system (Li 2006, 64; 
North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, 26; Olson 1993, 
571; Przeworski 1991, 14). The rule of law prevents 
incumbent governments from dodging elections, 
from manipulating electoral institutions, or from re-
pressing the opposition through selective infringe-
ments of individual and collective rights including 
property rights. The rule of law is inherently in ten-
sion with autocracy because autocracy implies that 
different rules apply to the government and the gov-
erned. While various autocracies including Imperial 
Germany in the 19th century or contemporary Sin-
gapore have achieved high levels of property rights 
protection, the credibility of legal guarantees is gen-
erally lower than in stable democracies because ulti-
mately the law remains at the discretion of the gov-
ernment (e.g. North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, 75). 
While the rule of law restricts the means for expro-
priating private property to legal instruments such as 
taxation, constitutional constraints restrict govern-
ments’ use of such instruments. Electoral account-
ability in future elections constrains governments’ 
ability to renege on popular policies in the present 
(Alesina 1988). At the same time, institutional sepa-
rations of power (federal structures, bicameral leg-
islatures, coalition agreements, constitutional courts 
etc.) force the government to accommodate vari-
ous veto players in the policy process.  This makes 
policy change difficult in general (Mattes and Ro-
dríguez 2013, 3), and makes wasteful and unpopu-
lar policy change difficult in particular. For policy 
proposals that do not appeal to a broad range of 
interests are particularly likely to be blocked by 
veto players. Of course, democratic governments 
can still renege on their promises – but only if the 
breach of promise enjoys broad political support. 
Autocracies lack political checks and balances. 
While the government is politically accountable to 
its supporters, this fails to ensure long-term pol-
icy predictability because the range of support-
ers may change. The government may be toppled 
by a competitor relying on a different support co-
alition or decide to reshuffle its own. In either 
way, the change can be radical and abrupt (Olson 
1993). Just think of the rapid disempowerment of 
the Russian Oligarchs under Putin (Appel 2008).
The constraining effects of political regimes matter 
for international tax competition because tax compe-
tition involves risky investments: direct investments 
in location-specific production facilities in low tax 
countries; direct investments in management and 
service operations (holding companies, headquar-
ter services, sales centers, financial services com-
panies) that serve as receiving ends of international 
profit-shifting into low-tax countries;3 portfolio in-
vestments that investors conceal from tax authori-
ties at home and therefore cannot easily repatriate.4 
Given the risky investments involved, democra-
cies enjoy a general advantage in tax competition. 
The rule of law ensures tax-driven investors against 
tax policy abuses such as Russia’s arbitrary use of 
tax evasion charges for undercutting BP’s grip on 
Russian oil companies (Belton 2008). Even capri-
cious dictators usually prefer keeping their loot in 
sober democracies like Switzerland to entrusting it 
to another capricious dictator.  Given their rule of 
law credentials, democracies can attract (or retain) 
more capital at any given tax rate than autocracies 
(Dharmapala and Hines 2009, 1065): they pull in 
more capital at low rates, and lose less capital at high 
rates. Autocracies have to offer more in terms of tax 
concession in order to achieve the same effect in 
terms of capital investments (Jensen 2003; Li 2006). 
The effect of constitutional constraints is more am-
biguous. On the one hand, electoral accountability 
and political checks and balances increase the cred-
ibility of low tax guarantees in small democracies. 
Their inbuilt bias towards centrist policies favors tax 
cuts over tax hikes because, according to the base-
22
ces papers - open forum # 9
line model, the majority in a small country gains 
from low and suffers from high capital taxes. This 
makes a reversal of low tax policies unlikely. Not 
by accident, the corporate tax is the only major tax 
the Irish government never considered raising dur-
ing the recent fiscal crisis. On the other hand, consti-
tutional constraints reduce the credibility of low-tax 
guarantees in large democracies. Given the unfavor-
able effects of low capital tax rates on the median 
voter, the inbuilt bias towards centrist policies fa-
cilitates tax raises. Tellingly, the only country in the 
OECD that had a higher corporate tax rate in 2013 
than twenty years earlier in 1993 is large: France.
Given the lack of constitutional constraints, the tax 
policies of autocratic regimes are generally less 
predictable and more susceptible to abrupt change 
than in democracies. Fiji’s 5000 percent tax hike 
on foreign water producers in 2013 is a graphic ex-
ample (Lester 2010). Promises of low capital taxa-
tion are less credible than in (small) democracies. 
In summary, there is a “democratic advantage” (Schul-
tz and Weingast 2003) in tax competition. On the one 
hand, the rule of law enables democracies to attract or 
retain more capital at any given tax rate than autocra-
cies. On the other hand, constitutional constraints en-
sure the long term stability and predictability of tax 
policies in general and add credibility to promises of 
low capital taxation in small democracies in particular. 
3.3 Empirical implications 
According to our model, tax competition induc-
es democracies but not autocracies to follow the 
logic of the economic baseline model. Autocra-
cies are less willing to adjust to competitive con-
straints because the low inclusiveness of their po-
litical institutions makes them largely insensitive 
to the welfare penalties of non-adjustments. Also, 
autocracies are less able to adjust because the rela-
tive lack of rule of law guarantees and constitutional 
constraints undermines the credibility of long-term 
policy commitments and lessens the supply of tax-
sensitive international capital at any given tax rate. 
The empirical implications of the model are straight-
forward. First, we should observe that democracies 
align their capital tax rates to country size: small 
democracies have systematically lower rates than 
large democracies (in line with the economic base-
line model). Second, tax rates in autocracies should 
be unresponsive to country size: small autocracies 
should not have systematically lower rates than 
large autocracies (in contrast to the baseline model)
Third, the responsiveness of intermediate regimes in 
between pure democracy and pure autocracy varies 
in the relative inclusiveness and openness of their 
political institutions: the tax rates of more inclusive 
and constitutionally constrained regimes should be 
more responsive to differences in country size than 
the rates of less inclusive and constrained regimes. 
4. Evidence: corporate tax competition with    
differences in regime type
In this section, we test our model against data on cor-
porate tax rates in 99 countries, 1999 to 2011. The 
findings support the theory: the more democratic (au-
tocratic) countries are, the stronger (weaker) is the as-
sociation between corporate tax rate and country size. 
Small democracies systematically undercut the taxes 
of large democracies, but small autocracies do not have 
significantly lower tax rates than large autocracies. 
We first introduce our variables and estimation strate-
gy (4.1), then turn to the regression analysis (4.2), and 
finally discuss the robustness of our findings (4.3).
4.1. Research Design 
Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable is the statutory corporate tax 
rate. While governments have various instruments 
of capital taxation, the corporate tax rate is arguably 
the5 most important. On the one hand, the corporate 
tax is a main revenue raiser in its own right and a 
crucial backstop to the revenue raising capacity of 
personal taxes on income and wealth6. To “many vot-
ers the corporation tax is a linchpin of any progres-
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sive tax system” (Slemrod 2004, 1172). On the other 
hand, the statutory rate is an important determinant 
of the effective corporate tax burden7, and the single 
most powerful tax incentive for cross-border FDI and 
profit-shifting8. While other variables including the 
corporate tax base and the tax system also matter, 
big accounting firms such as KPMG or Pricewater-
houseCoopers focus on the statutory corporate tax 
rate when comparing the business-friendliness of 
national tax systems (e.g. KPMG 2007-2011; PWC 
2013-2014).
We checked five data sources on corporate tax rates: 
the OECD tax database (OECD 2013), the KPMG 
corporate tax survey (KPMG 2007-2011),  the World 
Tax Database (Ross), the (IMF 2013) and World De-
velopment Indicators (Cao 2010). The OECD data is 
the most detailed and sophisticated but is limited to 
OECD member states9. We used it as a benchmark 
for checking the reliability of the other sources. The 
KPMG data correlates almost perfectly (0.98) with 
the OECD (2013) data, whereas the other three 
sources correlate below 0.75. We thus choose the in-
terpolated KPMG corporate tax rate as our dependent 
variable.
A more comprehensive analysis would also include 
so-called special corporate tax regimes, i.e. selective 
tax reductions for specific corporate forms, func-
tions, and investments. Arguably, special tax regimes 
constitute a powerful alternative to low corporate tax 
rates in the competition for foreign companies and 
profits (Keen 2001; Kemmerling and Seils 2009). Yet 
comparative time series data on special tax regimes 
is not available. We use Li’s cross-sectional data set 
on selective incentives in 53 developing countries to 
triangulate our results. We find that autocracies gen-
erally provide more incentives than democracies (Li 
2006). But we find no relationship between the num-
ber of incentives and country size (see Figure A2 in 
appendix). Hence, if small autocracies have higher 
statutory corporate tax rates than small democracies, 
as our model predicts, this is not because they com-
pete by other means (i.e. by incentives rather than 
rates). We are confident, therefore, that the omission 
of special tax regimes does not bias our results. 
Independent Variables
The most common indicator of country size is popu-
lation because the size of the population reflects the 
size of a country’s labor endowment (e.g. Bucovetsky 
1991). Since arguably the effect of national labor en-
dowments on corporate taxation is subject to dimin
ishing returns, we follow the standard practice in the 
literature and use the natural logarithm of popula-
tion as our measure of country size (Dharmapala and 
Hines 2009). The data is from the World Bank (2013). 
A possible objection to the population size measure is 
that it systematically overrates the size of population-
rich but capital-poor countries such as India or China. 
The most common indicator of regime type stems 
from the Polity IV project (Marshall, Jaggers, and 
Gurr 2011). Rather than treating democracy and au-
tocracy as a binary distinction, Polity conceptualizes 
it as a gradual scale ranging from purely democratic to 
purely nondemocratic and purely autocratic to purely 
non-autocratic regimes. Country scores on this scale 
reflect the inclusiveness of selection institutions and 
the constraints they impose on executives.  We convert 
the Polity scale to exclusively positive values running 
from zero (fully autocratic) to 20 (fully democratic). 
We use the polity2 score, which interpolates transi-
tion periods, treats interregnum periods as neutral 
(10) and codes foreign interruptions as missing cases. 
Unfortunately, Polity excludes micro-countries 
with populations of 500 000 inhabitants or less. 
Yet, if this exclusion should bias our results at all, 
the bias is downwards i.e. against our expectations 
because it excludes many notorious low tax ha-
vens such as the Cayman Islands (54 000 inhabit-
ants) or Liechtenstein (37 000 inhabitants). Hence, 
Polity provides a hard test for our argument. Yet, 
as a robustness check, we use two alternative mea-
sures of regime type that include smaller states: the 
“voice and accountability” variable from the World 
Bank’s good governance indicators (Kaufmann, 
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Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2012) and Freedom House’s 
political rights variable (FreedomHouse 2013).
Controls
In our robustness checks, we enter a number of 
control variables that previous studies identified as 
potential determinants of corporate tax rates. First, 
we include the Chinn-Ito-Index (2008) of capital ac-
count openness as more open economies are likely to 
be more susceptible to international tax competition: 
countries with fewer barriers should have lower cor-
porate tax rates. Second, we bring in a yearly lag of 
the row-standardized distance-weighted spatial lag 
of the corporate tax rate as the competition for in-
ward investment is likely to be more intense among 
neighboring than among distant countries. Third, we 
control for GDP per capita because wealthy countries 
tend to have higher taxes and a more effective tax 
administration (WorldBank 2013). Fourth, we enter 
health care spending as a percentage of GDP and 
GDP growth as indicators of expenditure require-
ments and revenue buoyancy (WorldBank 2013). 
Fifth, we include the share of agriculture in national 
accounts as a proxy for the monetization and, hence, 
taxability of the economy (WorldBank 2013), and 
the share of tax revenues in total government rev-
enues (IMF 2013) as a control for the availability 
of non-tax sources of revenue for instance from re-
source extraction (Burgess and Stern 1993; Tanzi 
and Zee 2000). Finally, we include two institutional 
variables – investor protection (WorldBank 2013) 
and regime durability (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 
2011) – that could potentially influence corporate 
tax rates independently of the political regime type. 
We test our argument by a random effects GLS mod-
el with splines to control for the temporal downwards 
trend in corporate taxation. As a robustness check we 
run an AR1 model to account for temporal depen-
dence. Given our interest in the effects of two slowly 
changing variables (country size and regime type), 
our main model neither includes fixed effects nor first 
differences. Yet, even taking out the averages by in-
does not change our main findings.  The model is 
very robust to different specification and measure-
ments. 
4.2. Findings 
Table 1 shows the regression results for four different model 
specifications. 
Table 1: The Effect of Country Size and Regime Type on Corporate Tax Rates 
(1) 
No Interaction 
(2) 
Main Model 
(3) 
Fixed Effects 
(4) 
AR1 
     
Country size  2.21*** -0.26 0.14 0.56 
 (0.44) (0.66) (1.87) (0.70) 
Regime Type 0.067 -2.98*** -3.35*** -1.77*** 
 (0.071) (0.62) (0.84) (0.68) 
Interaction  0.18*** 0.21*** 0.100** 
  (0.037) (0.049) (0.040) 
Observations 1,166 1,166 1,166 1,166 
Countries 99 99 99 99 
R2 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.17 
Standard errors in parentheses. Constant and splines not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The first model estimates the additive effect of coun-
try size (i.e. population size) and regime type (i.e. 
polity score) on corporate tax rates. The findings 
support the economic baseline model: larger coun-
tries have higher corporate tax rates. Regime type, by 
contrast, does not seem to matter for taxes. The pic-
ture changes, once we include the interaction effect 
of country size and regime type in the main model 
(2): regime type becomes significant and changes 
signs, while country size does the opposite. The in-
teraction effect on tax rates is positive and signifi-
cant. Since the interaction effect is difficult to inter-
pret by coefficients alone, we graph it in figure 2. 
Figure 2: Conditional Effect of Regime Type on the Corporate 
Tax Rate depending on Country Size
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Figure 2 plots the marginal effect of a change in 
regime type (i.e. a one-point change on the Pol-
ity scale toward more democracy) on the corporate 
tax rate for all relevant country sizes. It shows that 
the sign and the magnitude of the effect crucially 
depend on country size. The effect switches signs 
at a population of around 14 million, i.e. a country 
roughly the size of the Netherlands. The smaller a 
country is from this point downwards, the stronger 
becomes the negative effect of regime type, i.e. the 
lower is the corporate tax rate as countries become 
more democratic10. The opposite applies to countries 
larger than 14 million. Here, the larger and the more 
democratic a country is, the higher is the corporate 
tax rate. The conclusion is in line with our model: 
democracies react more strongly to tax competi-
tion than autocracies at both, small and large, coun-
try sizes. Figure 3 further illustrates this finding. 
Figure 3: Predicted Corporate Tax Rates for Small and Large 
Autocracies and Democracies, holding all other Variables at 
their Mean
Small Democracy
Large Autocracy
Small Autocracy
Large Democracy
15 20 25 30 35
Predicted Corporate Tax Rate
Prediction
95% CIs
Values Used: Regime Type: Autocratic (1), Democratic(19), Population: Small (1 Mio), Large (100 Mio)
Figure 3 compares the predicted corporate tax rates 
of four hypothetical countries. The small democracy 
(1 million of population, Polity score of 19 11) has 
the lowest and the large democracy (100 million of 
population) has the highest predicted rate. The rate 
difference is large and significant. The predicted 
rates of the small and the large autocracy (1 million 
and 100 million of population respectively, Polity 
Score of 1) are in between both extremes, i.e. signifi-
cantly higher than those of the small democracy and 
considerably lower than those of the large democ-
racy. Yet they hardly differ from each other. Con-
clusion: Democracies are responsive to the struc-
tural constraint of country size, autocracies are not. 
Figure 3 focuses on cases of pure democracy and pure 
autocracy 12. But, pure autocracies are empirically
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rare. Only 11 countries in our sample of 99 countries 
were full autocracies (Polity Scores of 5 or lower) 
in 2010. All other non-democratic countries were 
intermediate regimes with moderate Polity Scores 
(5 to 15). What do our regression results say about 
their responsiveness to competitive constraints?
Fiture 4: Conditional Effect of Country Size on the Corporate 
Tax Rate depending on Regime Type 
Figure 4 graphs the marginal effect of country size 
on corporate tax rates for different regime types. 
As before, country size has no significant effect on 
corporate tax rates in autocracies (Polity Score of 5 
or less) but a strong and significant positive effect 
on tax rates in democracies (Polity Score of 15 or 
more). Yet, country size also has a significant effect 
on intermediate regimes with Polity Scores larger 
than 7. While non-democratic regimes are, on aver-
age, less able and willing to adjust to tax competi-
tion than democracies, most intermediate regimes 
do adjust to some degree. Singapore is a promi-
nent, if rather singular, example of an authoritar-
ian country successfully competing as a low tax 
haven for multinational companies (KMPG 2011). 
4.3 Robustness 
Our regression results suggest that a country’s 
propensity to adjust its tax rate to its country size 
increases steadily as the country moves from auto-
cratic to more democratic. This is a striking result 
given widespread concerns about a possible curvi-
linear relationship between regime type and public 
welfare. There is an important body of research 
arguing that intermediate regimes in between pure 
autocracy and democracy are more susceptible to 
government irresponsibility and policy mayhem 
than pure autocracies. Some authors find, for in-
stance, that intermediate regimes are more conflict-
prone than either pure autocracies or pure democra-
cies (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 85; Hegre et al. 2001; 
Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 273). Others claim that 
intermediate regimes are more conducive to preda-
tory government than pure autocracies (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2003, 68; Zakaria 2003, 15). In this 
perspective, we should expect intermediate regimes 
to be less responsive to international tax competi-
tion than autocracies, not more. Is our finding of a 
linear regime effect a methodological artefact? To 
investigate this question we separate our sample 
into three subsamples (full autocracies, full democ-
racies, and intermediate regimes) using the usual 
cut-off points on the Polity scale 13.  Figure 5 plots 
corporate tax rates against country size separately 
for each sub sample.
Figure 5: Country size and corporate tax rates in 99 countries 
by regime type, 2010. Sources: KPMG (2007-2011), World 
Bank (2013), and Marshall et al. (2011)  
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The picture that emerges from figure 5 is compati-
ble with the linear regime effect graphed in figure 4. 
Among the autocracies, corporate tax rates vary 
widely and are essentially unrelated to country size. 
Among the democracies, tax rates correlate strong-
22
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ly with country size. The tax policies of the interme-
diate group are in between: the range of tax rates is 
more restricted than among the pure autocracies but 
the association with country size, while weakly sig-
nificant, is less pronounced than among democra-
cies. As an additional check, we regress the corporate 
tax rate on country size separately for each of the 
three sub-samples for all available country-years 
1999-2011 (see appendix table A2). The same pat-
tern emerges as in figures 4 and 5: tax rates in inter-
mediate regimes are more responsive to country size 
than in autocracies but less responsive than in de-
mocracies. This supports our claim of a linear regime 
effect in tax competition. 
Our regression results are also robust to a whole 
range of different modeling strategies. As table 1 il-
lustrates, including fixed effects instead of random 
effects (model 3) or using an auto-regressive model 
rather than splines (model 4) does not change the in-
teraction effect of country size and regime type on 
the corporate tax rate. The effect is also robust to 
different samples and operationalizations. Table A3 
(appendix) applies our main model to five different 
subsamples (Latin America, Middle East & North 
Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as 
all Non-OECD countries). The effect is robust over 
all these subsamples, indicating that they are not 
driven by any particular country or world region. 
Table A4 (appendix) shows our model with dif-
ferent measurements of country size (GDP) and 
regime type (the World Bank’s “voice and ac-
countability” index and Freedom House’s political 
rights variable). While, there are differences in ef-
fect size, especially for the political rights variable, 
these differences only reflect the different scales 
used. The substantive effect remains unchanged. 
Table A5 (appendix) shows the main model with ad-
ditional control variables. Again, the key findings 
remain unchanged. Most controls have the expected 
sign but are not consistently significant or completely 
insignificant (openness, growth, agriculture, tax rev-
enue, health spending). Perhaps most importantly, 
the two institutional controls (durability and inves-
tor protection) have no significant effect on corporate 
tax rates, supporting our notion that the credibility 
of legal guarantees does not vary independently of 
5. Theoretical and political implications 
Why do not more governments adopt low or zero 
capital taxes to reap the benefits of international 
capital inflows even though the experience of many 
tax havens suggests this as a way to get rich? The 
economists’ response refers to structural differ-
ences between countries: small countries benefit 
from competitive tax cutting; large countries don’t. 
Yet not all small countries follow a low tax strat-
egy, while some large countries do. What drives 
these seemingly inefficient tax rate choices? As we 
have argued in this paper it is political regime dif-
ferences. Democracies have an incentive to adjust 
tax rates to international competitive constraints 
as proxied by their country size, while autocracies 
do not. Autocracies are less willing to adjust be-
cause their low inclusiveness makes them insensi-
tive to the welfare penalties of non-adjustments. At 
the same time, they are also less able to adjust be-
cause the relative lack of constitutional constraints 
on government discretion undermines their ability to 
make credible long-term policy commitments: at any 
given tax rate they attract less capital than democra-
cies. There is not only an advantage of smallness in 
tax competition but also an advantage of democracy. 
We tested our explanation against corporate tax 
rate data for 99 countries. The evidence supports 
our argument. As our regressions show, the corpo-
rate tax rates of democracies vary systematically in 
country size while the corporate tax rates of autoc-
racies are insensitive to country size. The sensitiv-
ity of tax rates to country size increases steadily, 
as countries become relatively more democratic. 
Our findings contribute to at least three bodies of 
literature: the economics literature on tax competi-
tion, the comparative political economy literature 
on varieties of domestic institutions, and the gen-
eral political science literature on globalization. 
Take the economics literature first. According to the 
economic baseline model the logic of tax competi-
tion works equally for countries of different regime 
type. As our findings show, this is not the case. In-
stitutions matter. Democracies are more sensitive to 
their competitive environment than autocracies and 
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This may be misleading. Our findings rather sug-
gest that tax competition affects the revenue raising 
capacity of countries differently: it raises revenues 
in small, but decreases revenues in large countries. 
International competition has important effects 
which, however, cancel out in a global perspective.
Another potentially important example of a false 
negative is the widespread claim that party effects 
on redistributive policies are increasingly difficult to 
identify (Garrett and Mitchell 2001, 173; Hays 2003, 
99; Lierse 2012; Swank 2013, 23).  A standard ex-
planation is that globalization constrains the viabil-
ity of leftist policy agendas of domestic redistribu-
tion.  Our findings suggest that it may not bso much 
as the contradictory incentives of globalization for 
left parties in small and large countries that explain 
this result. While in small democracies, the left has 
an incentive to forego domestic redistribution from 
national capital in favor of international redistribu-
tion through foreign capital inflows, in large democ-
racies the left has an incentive to continue favoring 
domestic redistribution. Hence, left parties in the for-
mer will generally be open to cross-class coalitions 
with capital, while left parties in the latter will seek 
to mobilize labor against capital. As a consequence, 
party differences matter very little in small coun-
tries but gain in salience as countries grow larger. 
Finally, our findings speak to the broad political sci-
ence literature on globalization. This literature gener-
ally assumes that the rise of global markets increases 
pressure on national governments. Some say, global 
markets increase economic insecurity and thus raise 
political demand for social protection (compensation 
thesis). Others claim that globalization exerts down-
ward pressure on taxation and thus undermines the 
ability to fund social protection (efficiency thesis). In 
either way, the burden on national policy increases. 
Our analysis highlights by contrast that globalization 
has different effects for different countries.  It sug-
gests that autocracies are generally less constrained 
by global market pressures than democracies be-
cause their domestic institutional set insulates the 
government from both mass demands for compensa-
tion and the welfare costs of economic inefficiency. 
Democracies are more constrained but the direction 
of the constraint varies in country size.  For small 
hence more likely to conform to the predictions of the 
baseline model. Apparently democratic governments 
do in fact care for the well-being of their people and 
adjust their tax policies accordingly. That’s the good 
news. The bad news is that tax competition has no 
disciplining effect on autocratic rulers. Because they 
are autocratic, they care less for the general welfare 
implications of their tax policies and hence are less 
easily deterred by adverse international consequenc-
es of their domestic tax policy choices. Contrary to 
what some economists argue (Brennan and Buchan-
an 1980; Edwards and Keen 1996; Weingast 1995), 
tax competition cannot simulate by external pressure 
the tax policy constraints of domestic democracy.
The comparative political economy literature on va-
rieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001), democ-
racy (Hays 2009), welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 
1990) or tax regimes (Campbell 2005) focuses almost 
exclusively on institutional differences between ad-
vanced OECD countries. There is nothing in our re-
sults to suggest that these differences don’t matter for 
corporate taxation. The results do suggest, however 
that these differences matter less than the differences 
between democracies and autocracies. While we ob-
serve a high level of consistency among the corporate 
tax rates of democracies, we find considerable vari-
ance among the non-democratic regimes. Perhaps 
the comparative political economy literature should 
take more interest in the varieties of autocracy and 
link them up more systematically with established 
research on varieties of democratic countries in order 
not to miss the global wood for all the OECD-trees. 
Our findings also suggest that, contrary to the ‘vari-
eties of’ literature, similar domestic institutions can 
have dissimilar policy effects depending on a coun-
try’s structural position in the international econo-
my: While democratic institutions exert downward 
pressure on capital taxation in small countries they 
are associated with relatively high capital taxes in 
large countries. Neglecting this interaction leads to 
false negatives. For instance, the fact that the gen-
eral downward trend in corporate tax rates in core 
OECD countries has not been associated with a gen-
eral downward trend in corporate tax revenues has 
been interpreted as proof that the competition does 
not affect governments’ revenue raising ability (Gar-
rett 1998; Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Swank 2002). 
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democracies, the constraint is beneficial. They profit 
from the asymmetric redistributive effects of inter-
national tax competition because the competition-
induced capital inflow reduces political demand for 
social compensation (by stimulating the labor mar-
ket) while at the same time improving the ability to 
pay for social compensation (by enlarging the do-
mestic tax base). Large democracies suffer from the 
reverse effects. In contrast to other forms of inter-
national competition (security dilemma, tariff wars), 
tax competition is a form of competition, small coun-
tries can actually win. The good news is that most 
countries are small. The bad news is that most peo-
ple live in large countries and have to pay the bill. 
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endnotes
 1. All predictions of the baseline model depend crucially on the assumption that capital gener-
ates labor demand in its country of (source) taxation. This assumption is unproblematic as long 
as countries compete over real investment in productive assets. It is less straightforward, how-
ever, when the competition is about financial capital (bonds, bank claims, equity, corporate pa-
per profits, intangible assets, etc.) because financial capital is not directly and physically tied to 
real activity. Indirectly, however, it also creates labor demand. This is partly because financial 
capital boosts demand for financial services. Financial services are associated with high-skilled 
jobs, contribute to human capital formation and are subject to considerable agglomeration 
economies, as examples such as Switzerland, Luxembourg, Ireland or Singapore demonstrate. 
Also, tax-induced inflows of financial capital often bring real capital in their wake. There are 
various reasons for this. One is regulatory. Large Western democracies like the United States, 
Japan, Germany and the UK have elaborate anti-avoidance legislation in place that disallows 
companies to park profits and capital in subsidiaries in low tax countries unless these subsid-
iaries perform some minimally useful economic functions beyond tax minimization. Hence, if 
companies want to profit from low tax rates abroad they have to make sure that subsidiaries 
in low tax jurisdictions do a little more than just stripping affiliated companies in high tax ju-
risdictions of tax base. Keen and Konrad (2012:20) conclude that the insights of the baseline 
model “seem reasonably robust to the mix between real and paper shifting of tax bases”.
2. Measuring country size by GDP rather than population does not change the picture. See Ap-
pendix figure A1.
3. Multinational companies engaging in profit shifting from subsidiaries in high tax countries 
to subsidiaries in low tax countries are vulnerable to tax increases in the latter because these 
would put the profitability of the entire multinational group is at stake. This gives the govern-
ments of low tax countries some leverage for extortion.   
4. Efficiency-driven investors (i.e. capital owners investing abroad for the purpose of exploit-
ing non-tax locational advantages) can usually rely on the assistance of their home country if 
the host country defrauds them. Tax-driven investors (i.e. capital owners investing abroad in 
order to minimize taxes at home) usually cannot. Since the very purpose of their investment is 
to deny revenue to the home country, the home country has little reason to defend these invest-
ments against encroachment by the host country.
5. For the summary statistics of all variables see table A1 in the appendix.
6. In the absence of a corporate tax, individual income owners could use corporations as onshore 
tax shelters for instance by retaining profits in companies or by reclassifying labor income as 
capital income. By preventing such abuse, the corporate tax backs up the personal income tax. 
The effectiveness of this backstop function hinges crucially on the statutory corporate tax rate, 
for as long as the corporate tax rate is lower than the top personal income tax rate there is an 
incentive to shift personal income into the corporate sector (Ganghof & Genschel 2008: 61). 
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endnotes
7. Duane Swank (2013: 17) reports that statutory corporate rates are strongly correlated (correla-
tion coefficient .90-plus) with effective average tax rates on highly profitable enterprises in his 
sample of 18 OECD-countries.
8. In deciding where to declare taxable profits, multinational companies seek to use all allowances 
and deductions available in any jurisdiction. Having done so, any excess profit is taxed at the 
statutory rate. Hence it is the statutory rate which is central in determining the location of profit 
(Devereux & Sørensen 2006: 6).
9. For instance, the OECD (2013) includes not only national corporate taxes but also subnational 
business taxes on corporate profit. This can make a dramatic difference. As indicated by IMF data 
(2013), the German national corporate tax is only 15 percent but this ignores substantial subna-
tional business taxes. Including these subnational taxes, the OECD (2013) arrives at an overall 
German corporate income tax rate of 30 percent.
10. Please note from the kernel density also pictured in the graph that the majority of countries 
is smaller than 14 million. Thus, more countries (but not people) are in a structural position to 
benefit from tax competition.
11. All Polity Scores refer to the transformed 0-20 scale. 
 
12. Pure democracies have a Polity Score of 20, pure autocracies have a score of 0). 
13. Polity Scores for full autocracies range from 0 to 5, for full democracies from 15 to 20, and for 
intermediate regimes from 6 to 14 on our transformed 0-20 scale.
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FIGURES AND TABLES
Table 1: The Effect of Country Size and Regime Type on Corporate Tax Rates 
(1) 
No Interaction 
(2) 
Main Model 
(3) 
Fixed Effects 
(4) 
AR1 
     
Country size  2.21*** -0.26 0.14 0.56 
 (0.44) (0.66) (1.87) (0.70) 
Regime Type 0.067 -2.98*** -3.35*** -1.77*** 
 (0.071) (0.62) (0.84) (0.68) 
Interaction  0.18*** 0.21*** 0.100** 
  (0.037) (0.049) (0.040) 
Observations 1,166 1,166 1,166 1,166 
Countries 99 99 99 99 
R2 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.17 
Standard errors in parentheses. Constant and splines not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1: Country size and corporate tax rate of 113 countries, 
2011. Sources: KPMG (2007-2011) and World Bank (2013). 
ces papers - open forum # 22
14 Million
0
.05
.1
.15
.2
K
er
ne
l D
en
si
ty
−2
−1
0
1
2
C
on
di
tio
na
l E
ffe
ct
10 15 20
Logged Population
Effect 95% Confidence Intervals
Figure 2: Conditional Effect of Regime Type on the Corpo-
rate Tax Rate depending on Country Size
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Figure 3: Predicted Corporate Tax Rates for Small and 
Large Autocracies and Democracies, holding all other Vari-
ables at their Mean
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Figure 4: Conditional Effect of Country Size on the 
Corporate Tax Rate depending on Regime Type
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Figure 5: Country size and corporate tax rates in 99 
countries by regime type, 2010. Sources: KPMG (2007-
2011), World Bank (2013), and Marshall et al. (2011).
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Figure A1: Country Size and Corporate Tax Rate of 113 
Countries, 2011. Sources: KPMG (2007-2011) and World 
Bank (2013).
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Figure A2: Number of Special Tax Incentives available in 60 Democra-
cies and Autocracies, 2000. Sources: Li (2006), World Bank (2013), and 
Marshall et al. (2011).
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Corporate Tax Rate KPMG 1322 27.1 9.9 0.0 55.0 
Logged Population World Bank 2782 15.1 2.4 9.1 21.0 
Regime Type Polity IV Project 2089 13.5 6.5 0.0 20.0 
Voice 
Good Governance 
Indicators 
2289 0.0 1.0 -2.3 1.8 
Political Rights Freedom House 2499 4.6 2.2 1.0 7.0
Capital Account Openness Chinn-Ito 2336 0.4 1.6 -1.9 2.4 
GDPpc World Bank 2499 8.2 13 0.1 108 
Health Spending World Bank 1390 2.7 1.5 0.0 9.6 
Growth World Bank 2517 4.2 5.2 -41.3 61.9 
Agriculture % GDP World Bank 2156 14.6 13.9 0.0 96.6 
Tax Revenue IMF 1988 0.6 0.2 0.0 1.3 
Investor Protection World Bank 1081 0.0 1.0 -2.7 2.0 
Durability Polity IV Project 2128 24.9 30.6 0.0 202.0 
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Table A2: The Effect of Country Size on the Corporate Tax Rate for three different Regime Types, 
1999-2011 
 Autocracies Intermediate 
Regimes  
Democracies 
    
Population 1.22 1.23 2.88*** 
 (1.47) (0.82) (0.42) 
    
Observations 151 201 814 
Countries 17 29 72 
R2 0.09 0.14 0.39 
Standard errors in parentheses. Constant and splines not reported.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3: The Effect of Regime Type and Country Size on Corporate Tax Rates – Regional 
Models 
 Non-OECD Latin 
America 
MENA South Asia SSA 
      
Population -0.41 -19.9** 1.51 -7.19** -4.65 
 (0.75) (8.70) (2.58) (3.54) (3.16) 
Regime Type -3.15*** -19.6** -8.93* -8.04** -6.75**
 (0.72) (7.94) (4.85) (3.96) (3.03) 
Interaction 0.19*** 1.13** 0.58** 0.43** 0.41** 
      
Observations 769 220 148 52 114 
Countries 68 17 14 4 10 
R2 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.25 0.53 
Standard errors in parentheses. Constant and splines not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4: The Effect of Regime Type and Country Size on Corporate Tax Rates – Different 
Measurement  
 Political Rights Voice lnGDP   as size 
Size  0.68 2.30*** -0.89 
 (0.75) (0.40) (0.74) 
Regime Type -4.64** -7.90* -3.72*** 
 (2.04) (4.70) (0.99) 
Interaction 0.26** 0.51* 0.15*** 
 (0.12) (0.29) (0.040) 
Observations 1,236 1,115 1,159 
Countries 107 114 99 
R2 0.23 0.27 0.20 
Standard errors in parentheses. Constant and splines not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A5: The Effect of Regime Type and Country Size on Corporate Tax Rates – Controls
 Controls I Controls II Controls III Controls IV 
Size  -0.63 -0.85 0.24 -0.79 
 (0.67) (1.02) (0.89) (1.01) 
Regime Type -2.79*** -2.53** -2.44*** -2.54** 
 (0.63) (1.05) (0.90) (1.10) 
Interaction 0.17*** 0.15** 0.14*** 0.14** 
 (0.037) (0.060) (0.052) (0.060) 
Openness -0.55** -0.69**  -0.58 
 (0.22) (0.33)  (0.47) 
Spatial Lag 0.50*** 0.93***  1.34*** 
 (0.11) (0.24)  (0.40) 
GDPpc  0.58***  0.96*** 
Health Spending  -0.43  -0.47 
  (0.42)  (0.44) 
  (0.20)  (0.21) 
Growth  -0.0049  -0.18*** 
  (0.066)  (0.063) 
Agriculture  0.071  0.20* 
  (0.094)  (0.11) 
Tax Revenue  1.06  7.40** 
  (2.89)  (3.75) 
Investor Protection   -0.16 -0.061 
   (0.29) (0.41) 
Durability   0.031* 0.015 
   (0.019) (0.030) 
Observations 1,140 471 566 155 
Countries 96 57 98 53 
R2 0.21 0.33 0.26 0.56 
Standard errors in parentheses. Constant and splines not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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